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In this paper, I assume that the study of the origin of language is strictly connected to
the analysis of the traits that distinguish human language from animal communication.
Usually, human language is said to be unique in the animal kingdom because it
enables and/or requires intentionality or mindreading. By emphasizing the importance of
mindreading, the social brain hypothesis has provided major insights within the origin of
language debate. However, as studies on non-human primates have demonstrated that
intentional forms of communication are already present in these species to a greater or
lesser extent, I maintain that the social brain is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
to explain the uniqueness of language. In this paper, I suggest that the distinctive feature
of human communication resides in the ability to tell stories, and that the origin of
language should be traced with respect to the capacity to produce discourses, rather
than phrases or words. As narrative requires the ability to link events distant from one
another in space and time, my proposal is that in order to explain the origin of language,
we need to appeal to both the social brain and the ecological brain – that is, the cognitive
devices which allow us to mentally travel in space and time.
Keywords: ecological brain, global coherence, mental time travel, narrative, origin of language, storytelling,
relevance theory, social brain
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I argue that the study of the origin of language is strictly connected to the analysis
of the traits that distinguish human language from animal communication. The basic assumption
of my proposal is that the distinctive feature of language resides in the ability, typically human, to
tell stories, and that the origin of language should be traced in reference to this ability to produce
discourses, rather than phrases or words. Supporting the narrative basis of language has important
effects both in terms of the recognition of the essential properties of human communication and
the investigation of the cognitive systems dedicated to the processing of such properties. Since
global coherence is the foundational property of the ability to produce and understand discourses,
this paper analyzes the cognitive systems that can process such a property.
The study of the cognitive systems that process the narrative level is a privileged point of view
to test one of the most relevant cognitive theories about the origin of language: the idea that the
transition to language from animal communication has to be found in the specific social brain of
our species. Against such idea, my thesis is that the cognitive devices of the social brain are unable
to guarantee the narrative character of human communication, and that the properties processed
by the social brain are not sufficient to justify the origin of human language. In order to explain the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1138
fpsyg-07-01138 July 29, 2016 Time: 17:10 # 2
Ferretti Ecological Brain and Language Origins
origin of language, in fact, behind the social brain we have to
appeal to the ecological brain (i.e., the cognitive devices at the
base of our ability to navigate in space and time). The first move
to examine the specific role played by the ecological brain in the
origin of language is to justify the narrative character of human
communication.
NARRATIVE REPRESENTATION
The reason why we should consider the ability to tell stories
as the distinctive trait of language lies in the fact that narrative
is the specific way through which humans represent their
experiences. Following Bruner (1991, p. 4), in fact, “we organize
our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly
in the form of narratives — stories, excuses, myths, reasons for
doing and not doing, and so on”. Despite being in contrast with
Bruner’s cultural constructivism, the idea that narrative is the
distinctive trait of human experience representation serves as the
basis of my paper’s assumptions as well.
The hypothesis that human nature is defined in reference
to narrative abilities has received consensus in the scientific
community (Thompson, 2010; Corballis, 2014, 2015; McBride,
2014). Niles (1999), for example, defined humans in terms of
Homo narrans. Maintaining that “humans (. . .) are unique in
sharing stories”, Thompson (2010, p. 398) suggested that the
individuals of our species are better defined as Homo fabulator.
Corballis (2015, p. 107) proposed a quite similar definition:
If there is anything that defines our species as unique (. . .) it is
the telling of stories, and the invention of language as the means
of doing so. (. . .) Other animals, even rats, may well undertake
limited mental travels through limited domains, but stories allow
us to expand our mental lives to unlimited horizons.
Following such considerations, it is plausible to maintain
that the human ability to tell story might be considered as a
product of biological evolution process. According to Gottschall
(2012), for example, storytelling capacities play an important
adaptive role. Furthermore, in his view, the narrative ability
works very similarly to a flight simulator: it allows humans to
gain experience of the most intricate affairs of life by sitting safely
in an armchair. Nowadays, the topic of the narrative evolution
remains the focus of a very interesting debate (Dautenhahn, 2002;
Hirstein, 2005; Gottschall and Wilson, 2005; Scalise Sugiyama,
2005; Collins, 2008, 2013; Boyd, 2009; Gottschall, 2012; Herman,
2013).
In this paper, I maintain that the question of language origin
has to appeal to the analysis of the abilities to tell stories because
in storytelling nestle the properties that have allowed humans to
develop a very different kind of communication from that used
by other animals. The justification of my thesis goes through
a two-step argument: to prove that narrative abilities precede
(logically and temporally) language and to prove that language
was born specifically in order to tell stories. Such a two-step
argument will receive support from empirical research on the
cognitive architectures implicated in narrative processing. And
it is in reference to such an analysis that it will be possible
to appreciate the role played by the navigational systems in
space and time (two of the main components of the ecological
brain) in order to explain the narrative hypothesis of the origin
of language. Before analyzing the cognitive system implicated
in narrative processing, it is right to deal with the hypothesis
(the prevalent one) that the social brain is the necessary and
sufficient condition to explain the transition from animal to
human communication.
THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE
The social nature of language is a well-known and not
disputable fact. In cognitive science, a lot of models explain
the origin of language calling upon the processing systems
in use in the management of social behavior (Origgi and
Sperber, 2000; Sperber, 2000; Tomasello, 2008; Scott-Phillips,
2014, 2015). In this perspective, the characteristic features of
human communication depend upon the properties processed by
the cognitive devices that compose the social brain.
The Social Brain
Frith and Frith (2010, p. 165) maintained that the social brain
allows “humans to boldly go where no other species has been”. In
order to understand the kind of relationship that ties language
and social brain together it is necessary to clarify the specific
cognitive function of the social brain. In a paper that represents
a cornerstone in the study of the social life of primates from a
cognitive point of view, Humphrey (1976, p. 307) maintained that
the brain evolution of the great primates is not dependent on the
challenges that originate from the ecological world. By observing
mountain gorillas’ behaviors, Humphrey theorized that the main
cognitive abilities of great primates are primarily dependent on
the management of the social worlds, as “the chief role of creative
intellect is to hold society together”. The same considerations
are applicable to the case of human beings: the creativity and
flexibility in characterizing the behaviors of the individuals of
our species may be considered a form of adaptation to the
challenges imposed by the social environment. In a similar way,
Dunbar (1998, 2009) maintained that the management of social
relationships has led humans to the development of a brain that
is unique in the animal world. The role of the nervous system
in the management of relations with other individuals emerges
clearly when, following Berthoz (2002), the brain is considered as
a machine essentially assigned to predict future, to anticipate the
consequences of one’s own or other people’s action, and to “buy
time”. The difference between the solution of problems imposed
by the physical environment and competition with the other
competing individuals for the solution of the same problems
is crucial in adaptation. With the expression “Machiavellian
intelligence,” Byrne and Whiten (1988) referred to one of the
most pressing evolutionary challenges with which primates had
to deal, namely, the ability to predict and control the behavior of
the others, using them as a means to their own ends. It is neither
the case to delve into the details of evolutionary genesis of the
social brain, nor to discuss in detail the social intellect specific
functions. As my main interest in this section is the analysis of the
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relationship between the social brain and the origin of language, a
tangible clue to start is the distinction between a communication
founded on involuntary signals and a communication founded in
voluntary signals.
Not always would communication have a voluntary character.
The social brain is able to grasp the involuntary signals that an
organism produces by simply moving into the environment. Frith
and Frith (2010) maintained that from a biological motion the
social brain is able to obtain information related to the intentional
states of an individual and to identify the causes of his actions
before he acts effectively. The most interesting case to study the
relationship between the social brain and language is the case
of voluntary communication. Referring to the voluntary acts of
communication, it is possible to construct a specific hypothesis
of the origin of language. Frith and Frith maintained that such
acts have an ostensive character, a feature of great importance, as
we shall see, to identify the essential features of human language.
The reference to the ostensive character of communication leads
us to one of the main theoretical framework to study the role of
social brain in the origin of language: the Relevance Theory (RT)
proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986).
Ostensive Communication
At the foundation of RT is the criticism to the code model
of communication (Shannon, 1948). Against such a model,
Sperber and Wilson (1986) appealed to the theory of meaning
founded on speaker’s intentions proposed by Grice (1957, 1969,
1982). Unlike in animal communication (due to the model
code), in human communication, what the speaker says will
not always coincide with what is intended to mean. The
shifting focus of attention from what the speaker says to what
he/she intends to say has profound implications on the level of
cognitive architectures: as pragmatic interpretation is ultimately
an exercise in metapsychology, human communication implies a
mindreading device (Sperber and Wilson, 2002). This conception
has implications also for the origin of language: If the
transition to human communication has to appeal to the meta-
representational plan, then a mindreading system has to be a
cognitive prerequisite for the advent of language (Origgi and
Sperber, 2000). In Sperber’s opinion:
[H]uman communication is a by-product of human meta-
representational capacities. The ability to perform sophisticated
inferences about each other’s states of mind evolved in our
ancestors as a means of understanding and predicting each
other’s behavior. (. . .) Language made inferential communication
immensely more effective. It did not change its character. All
human communication, linguistic or non-linguistic, is essentially
inferential. (Sperber, 1995, p. 199).
That said, the reference to the speaker’s intentions and to
the mindreading system are too general to provide an account
of the specific nature of human communication. To understand
correctly the questions involved in the origin of language, it is
necessary to propose more articulated distinctions.
At the level of properties, we have to distinguish between the
informative and the communicative character of the speaker’s
intention. Sperber and Wilson (2002, p. 255) schematized in
this way the two forms of intention at the basis of ostensive
communication:
The Informative Intention
The intention to inform an audience of something;
The Communicative Intention
The intention to inform the audience of one’s informative
intention
If, during a dinner at the restaurant, looking for the gaze of the
waiter, I lifted the empty bottle of wine stretching out my arm,
the waiter would understand my request to have a new bottle
(full, of course). Bringing a new bottle of wine, the waiter would
show that he had caught my informative intention and thus that
he understood the content of my request. For communication to
be successful, however, in addition to my informative intention,
there is something further that the waiter must have caught.
Through eye contact and the attention to my arm gesture, the
waiter has to catch my communicative intention, that is, the
intention to inform him of my intention to have another wine
bottle. What kind of cognitive systems ensures the development
of the two different forms of intentions?
Ostensive communication gains support on the idea that
the specific nature of human communication “depends upon
sophisticated forms of social cognition that are unique to
humans and which evolved in our species as a result of
our über-social nature” (Scott-Phillips, 2014, p. xiii). If the
specific trait of human communication has to be referred
to communicative intentions, then the appeal to a general
metacognitive system is not a sufficient move to explain the
ostensive character of communication. What is needed further
is a meta-communicative system, a sub-module of the mind-
reading module, an automatic application of a relevance-based
procedure to ostensive stimuli, and in particular to linguistic
utterances (Sperber and Wilson, 2002). I will return soon to the
role that this submodule plays on the origin of language but
before that, a consideration of a more general character.
According to the proponents of RT, the origin of language is
closely related to the transition from the code model to ostensive
communication. As recent studies have confirmed the intentional
nature of some forms of animal communication (Crockford et al.,
2012; Schel et al., 2013) an important point to stress here is that
the intentional nature of communication is insufficient to ensure
this form of transition. In Scott-Phillips’s (2014, p. 4) opinion, in
fact, ostensive communication
is not only intentional, it is overtly intentional. In other words,
not only signal used in a voluntary (i.e., intentional) way, but this
fact is made explicit (overt) to the audience, and this explicitness
contributes to successful comprehension. Consequently
demonstration of intentionality in animal communication is not
sufficient to demonstrate meaning in the sense that is relevant to
comparisons with human communication.
The result of these arguments is that if ostensive
communication cannot be reduced to the intentional character,
the origin of human communication must relate to the
emergence of a kind of features that is radically new with respect
to the features present in other forms of animal communication.
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In Scott-Phillips’ hypothesis “nothing that looks even remotely
like language can emerge prior to the evolution of ostensive-
inferential communication” (Scott-Phillips, 2014, p. 46). Now,
is ostensive communication really the exclusive prerogative
of human beings? Are the individuals of our species really
disposed to the cognitive characteristics requested by ostensive
communication? The answer to these questions is related to the
animal mindreading debate.
Animal Mindreading
The starting point of the debate is represented by Premack and
Woodruff’s (1978) question posed in their famous paper: Does the
chimpanzee have a “Theory of Mind”? As is known, the authors
answered positively to the question in this paper. Ten years
after the work written with Woodruff, however, Premack (1988)
returned to the topic and proposed a more cautious version of
mindreading abilities of great apes. In his new study, he was
willing to recognize that apes have a weaker theory of mind
than that of humans: chimpanzees would be able to attribute
perceptual and volitional states but would not be able to attribute
epistemic states (intentions and beliefs) to others. Also, Call and
Tomasello (2008) espoused a similar position; their opinion is
that it is possible to assign a broad form of mindreading to
chimpanzees, while it is not correct to attribute a narrow form
of mindreading to them:
It is time for humans to quit thinking that their nearest primate
relatives only read and react to overt behavior. (. . .) Even if
chimpanzees do not understand false beliefs, they clearly do not
just perceive the surface behavior of others and learn mindless
behavioral rules as a result. (. . .) In a broad construal of the phrase
“theory of mind,” then, the answer to Premack and Woodruff’
pregnant question of 30 years ago is a definite yes, chimpanzees
do have a theory of mind. But chimpanzees probably do not
understand others in terms of a fully human-like belief-desire
psychology in which they appreciate that others have mental
representations of the world that drive their action even when
those do not correspond to reality. And so in a more narrow
definition of theory of mind as an understanding of false beliefs,
the answer to Premack and Woodruff’s question might be no, they
do not (Call and Tomasello, 2008, p. 191).
Distinguishing between mindreading abilities between a broad
and a narrow sense is an important first step to address the
issue properly if apes are capable of attributing intentional states,
namely, to say that the question must be interpreted in terms of a
continuum that does not imply absolute answers in terms of yes
or no is the right way to proceed.
Having said that, what would the results of studies on
mindreading in non-human animals tell us on the origin
of language? Not much, for the advocates of the ostensive
model. Following Scott-Phillips (2014, p. 97), in fact, since
the mental state involved in ostensive communication are
epistemic states such as “intentions and beliefs (a “belief-desire
psychology”), and not simply knowledge states”, and since
empirical studies have prompted us to exclude that chimpanzees
are capable of mental attribution of epistemic states, it follows
that chimpanzees lack the cognitive prerequisites to develop an
ostensive communication.
The argument of Scott-Phillips is not fully convincing. The
reference to the type of state of mind does not seem to be
the point at issue to explain the ostensive character of human
communication. In fact, it is unclear whether the distinction
between types of mental states would be considered the right
move to do in order to distinguish between informative and
communicative intention. What is required to grasp the overtly
intentional nature of ostensive communication is a type of
skills independent from the state of mind to which it applies.
What we really need is a requirement easier to comply: the
ability to call attention to the fact (e.g., as when we use
eye contact to ask the waiter for a new bottle of wine) that
we intend to communicate something to someone. In light
of these considerations, the possibility of attributing ostensive
communication to non-human animals deserves further study.
A Deflationary Proposal
As Moore (2016, p. 225) maintained, “consensus is that—at least
in humans—where eye contact is used to address an utterance
to its intended audience, this suffices to make communicative
behaviors ostensive”, eye contact represents a useful tool for
evaluating the ostensive capacity of non-human animals. The
question of whether these animals are able to use eye contact to
the communicative purposes is controversial. Referring to Call
et al. (2000) empirical data, Scott-Phillips was skeptical; Moore
(2016; see also Csibra, 2010) maintained the opposite perspective:
In his view, the empirical results demonstrate that chimpanzees
seek eye contact before producing gestures (Hostetter et al., 2001;
Povinelli et al., 2003). Beyond the behavioral criteria, Moore
(2016) also discussed the psychological criteria for ostension. He
criticized the thesis that ostensive communication must appeal
to sophisticated systems of social cognition. His idea (see also
Gómez, 1994, 2007) is that:
It is sufficient for acting with communicative intent that one
produce (sincerely and in conjunction with one another) a sign
in order to elicit some behavioral response or action r from an
interlocutor and an act of address, with which one directs one’s
performance of that sign to the attention of one’s interlocutor.
(Moore, 2016, p. 226).
Adhering to a deflationary proposal implies that the ability
to produce ostensive communication goes beyond the limits
of the individuals of our species. Studies that demonstrated
chimpanzees’ ability to deliberately solicit the attention of others
before gesturing evinced that these animals are capable of
ostensive communication “even if the messages they produce
were only even very simple ones, and even if they struggled
to interpret many human forms of communication” (Moore,
2016, p. 227). These arguments can be used to maintain that the
ostensive character of the communication does not depend on the
type of mental state or on the complexity of the representational
level.
The conclusion drawn from such arguments is that the
adhesion to the deflationary approach comports a weakening of
the thesis of the existence of a property able to distinguish clearly
between animal and human communication. This conclusion has
important consequences for the evolution of language debate: As
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ostensive communication is not a useful criterion to distinguish
human language, then ostensive communication is not a useful
criterion to explain the origin of human communication. The
social brain hypothesis is not strong enough a criterion for
characterizing human language, and to find such a criterion we
have to seek elsewhere. Before this exposition presents this new
direction, one last clarification is necessary.
Arguing that the social brain is insufficient to provide an
account of the distinctive features of human communication, I
do not intend to deny the role of mindreading in characterizing
human language. Nor do I intend to deny the role of ostensive
communication (and more generally of RT) in the study of the
functioning and origin of language. What I intend to criticize
is the idea that, in order to characterize human language, it is
sufficient to refer to a single principle and a single processing
system. Ostensive communication is definitely a characteristic of
human communication, but for the reasons that I have examined,
it is not a robust criterion to distinguish language from animal
communication.
The study of the ecological niche in which human communi-
cation have originated proved to be a useful way to establish a
stronger criterion of differentiation. The analysis of the effective
environment in which our ancestral precursors had experimented
on the first forms of human communication paves the way to a
different approach to the origin of language. It is from the analysis
of this ecological niche, as I shall see, that comes to the fore the
possibility to study the origin of language in relation to the ability
to tell stories, the capacity that at the beginning of this paper I
considered as the distinctive trait of human beings.
Recruitment at the Origin of Language
According to Bickerton (2010), the selective pressures at the
origin of language has to be referred to the type of social
relationships (the recruitment) required by scavenging, the
prevailing activity of food procurement in the Oldowan niche
(Semaw et al., 2003; Plummer, 2004; Osvath and Gärdenfors,
2005). Since the exploitation of carcasses (especially the carcasses
of megafauna, the richest source of food lays) was a risky
activity, scavenging had been a selective pressure in favor of
cooperation between individuals. Therefore, it is exactly in the
activity of recruitment for cooperative purposes that our ancestral
relatives have developed increasingly sophisticated forms of
communication. As Bickerton (2010) maintained, the type of
effective communication for the purposes of recruitment has to
respect an important commitment: the need to provide detailed
information about something that is not directly present at
the audience’s view. A feature of this type is reflected in the
recruitment strategies employed by animals very distant from
us in evolution. After all, our ancestral relatives engaged in
recruitment had behaved very similarly to how ants and bees
behave when they inform their conspecifics about the location
of the food. Fitch et al. (2010) provided empirical support to
the hypothesis “that scavenged lifestyle selects for socio-cognitive
and communicative abilities” (Fitch et al., 2010, p. 806).
The thesis that recruitment has to be considered as a selective
pressure for the origin of language is in line with the social
brain hypothesis and those theoretical models that consider social
practices as an essential trait of human communication (Deacon,
1997; Christiansen and Chater, 2008; Tomasello, 2008). That the
social brain plays a role in the origin of language, as I have already
pointed out, is not obviously under discussion, the relevant
question here is whether the social brain represents a sufficient
condition for the origin of language. The case of recruitment will
help us to clarify this point at issue.
Considering it more carefully, recruitment is not only an
example in favor of the role of the social brain in the origin
of language. For example, in the case of bees, it is true that
communication between these insects “is devoted almost entirely
to recruitment” (Bickerton, 2010, p. 208), but it is also true that
in order “to continue searching for adequate “crowd” before
themselves returning to the carcass [informants] would have had
to give some indication as to where and/or how far away the
carcass was located”. The case of bees provides a starting point
to reflect on the connection between the social and the ecological
brain in communication. The irruption of the ecological brain in
social communication, as I shall see in detail, plays an important
role in the revision of the language origin model based on the
ostensive character of human communication. It refers to the
ability to travel in space and time that will possibly explain our
ability to tell stories: the typically human way of representing
reality that underlies the uniquely human way of communicating.
In order to specify the role of the ecological brain in the
narrative origin of language, we have to discuss what makes
narrative a narrative representation and what makes narrative
representation a precondition of human communication.
THE ECOLOGICAL BRAIN
What makes narrative representation so different from any other
form of representation is primarily its temporal character. In
Bruner’s (1991, p. 6) opinion:
A narrative is an account of events occurring over time. It is
irreducibly durative. It may be characterizable in seemingly non-
temporal terms (. . .), but such terms only summarize what are
quintessential patterns of events occurring over time. The time
involved, moreover, as Paul Ricoeur has noted, is “human time”
rather than abstract of “clock” time. It is time whose significant is
given by the meaning assigned to events within its compass.
Following Bruner, Dautenhahn (2002, p. 107) maintained that
narrative allows humans to extend their temporal horizon: it
is the ability to travel forward and back in time that makes
narrative “fundamentally different from communicative non-
narrative events that are limited to the immediate present”.
A second aspect of narrative, strictly related to the temporal
character, concerns the structure of causal connections between
events. As Herman (2013, p. 237) affirmed “from a structural
standpoint, one of the hallmarks of narrative is [the] linking of
phenomenon into causal-chronological wholes”. Essentially, it is
in the force of the causal and temporal structures characterizing
the ability to storytelling that narrative “constitutes a primary
resource for configuring circumstances and events into more
or less coherent scenarios involving the experiences of persons”
(ibid, p. 74).
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That being said, some clarification is needed. While I
recognize the validity of Bruner’s narrative representation
analysis, in this paper, I propose an idea of the causal relationship
between narrative and cognition that specularly respect the
opinions of Bruner. From my point of view, it is cognition that
constitutes narrative more than the contrary: the center of my
hypothesis is the idea that “global coherence” (the property at
the foundation of narrative) depends on the cognitive systems’
ability to project individuals in time and space and to process
the structure of the causal links between events. Before entering
in the analysis of the ecological brain’s role in the processing of
language’s narrative structure, it is useful to clarify what kind of
property is global coherence.
Global Coherence
As the most heated discussions regarding the definition of
global coherence relates to the question of its irreducibility
to cohesion (cf. e.g., Giora, 1985; Adornetti, 2015), for my
purposes in this paper, the most important issue concerns the
relationship between global coherence and relevance. It is in
reference to relevance that the question whether the social
brain is able to guarantee the origin of language. In fact, if
coherence is reducible to relevance, then, mindreading is able
to govern the development of narrative, and the social brain
can therefore be considered a sufficient condition for the origin
of language; if, on the contrary, global coherence were not
reducible to relevance, then mindreading would be unable to
guarantee narrative processing, and the social brain would not
be considered the cognitive system able to explain the origin of
language.
Giora (1997, 1998) brought convincing arguments to the
thesis of the irreducibility of global coherence to the principle
of relevance. Such arguments have given rise to a heated debate
with Wilson (1998). The debate’s focus concerns Giora’s thesis
that narrative processing relies on the identification of the causal
links governing the relationship between segments of discourse.
However, this is not the case to delve into the details of the
debate between Giora and Wilson. The issue that has to be
highlighted for my purposes is that the argument used by Wilson
(1998) in favor of the reducibility of coherence to relevance
rests on the idea that all you need to process the narrative plan
is a system that is able to grasp the speaker’s communicative
intention independently through the speaker’s organization of the
discourse segments in the communication flow. As Wilson (1998,
p. 67) maintained what essentially enables us to understand a
discourse “is the fact that it has an interpretation consistent with
the principle of relevance, whether or not the discourse segments
are related”, emphasis added). If Wilson’s thesis were correct, the
social brain would be sufficient to explain not only the language
functioning but also its narrative origin. That mindreading has a
role in narrative is a known and not a controversial fact (cf. Mar,
2011): To be controversial is the fact whether mindreading can
be considered the only system we need to explain the processing
of global coherence. As it is clear from Wilson’s quote, the
point in discussion to resolve the controversy is to decide if the
causal relationship between the discourse segments plays a role
in narrative processing.
Trabasso et al. (1984), Trabasso and Sperry (1985), and
Trabasso and van den Broek (1985) revealed evidence in favor
of the idea that the comprehension of global coherence implies
the processing of the causal links between events. From the point
of view of The Causal Network Model (CNM), the narrative
structure of a discourse is represented by a causal network
of events and event relations (Trabasso and Sperry, 1985).
Moreover, the idea that narrative depends on the ability to
manage the causal connections between events is highlighted
in several studies on storytelling in individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) (Losh and Capps, 2003; King et al.,
2013, 2014; Sah and Torng, 2015). Subjects with ASD “appeared
to have difficulty representing and retelling the gist of stories”
(Diehl et al., 2006, p. 88). Since such difficulty is connected to the
“difficulty [of] putting story retellings together as a meaningful
chain of events”, it has been proposed that the deficiencies in
global coherence of individuals with ASD could be explained in
reference to their difficulty in identifying the causal connections
that link together the events of the story. Despite Wilson’s idea,
therefore, the way in which the segments of discourse are causally
connected plays an important role in the processing of global
coherence.
However, there is more. To be in favor of the autonomy
of coherence from relevance comes out something more than
the reference to the causal structure of events alone; the fact
that, as I have already pointed out, narrative has an inherently
temporal structure. One of the main features of the holistic
character of narrative is that the understanding of the gist of
a story involves the connection between events distant in time.
A consideration of this kind has important effects on cognitive
architectures: The temporal character of narrative requires a kind
of processing system that cannot be reduced to the function
mode of mindreading. The cognitive system at the basis of
relevance does not have the computational resources required to
process the temporal level of storytelling (Ferretti and Adornetti,
in press).
The first consideration is related to the automatic nature
of mindreading processing. Apperly and Butterfill (2009)
distinguished two different types of mindreading: the first (i.e.,
automatic, fast, and unconscious) emerges early in a child, while
the second (i.e., deliberate, slow, and amenable to conscious
introspection) emerges only later. In Scott-Phillips’ (2014)
opinion, for the processing speed required, the mindreading
involved in language must be the one of the first type. An
important clue in favor of Scott-Phillips’ opinion is the fact that
the recognition of the speaker’s intentions is a non-demanding
task. That said, if the narrative processing was reducible to the
reading of the speaker’s intentions alone, then the narrative plan
would imply an automatic and effortless processing. Narrative
understanding, however, as is evident from the experience of
each of us, requires a considerable processing effort. The fact
that narrative processing involves effort is an important clue
against the idea that global coherence processing is managed by
mindreading alone. Another important clue is the fact that the
ability to grasp the speaker’s intentions is characterized as an
immediate and punctuated process (i.e., unextended in space and
time). Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2000) captured an important
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aspect of the matter by arguing that narrative processing cannot
be referred to processes that, by their character of immediacy, can
be processed within the confined space of the working memory.
A consideration of this type has implications not only for defining
the type of cognitive architectures involved in making narrative,
but also defining the type of information processed. Following
Apperly (2011), it is possible to attribute a quasi-perceptual
character to the kind of information that is processed by the first
type of mindreading. In addition, it is in reference to this kind of
information that Scott-Phillips (2014, p. 72) maintained:
that mindreading is often less like thinking, and more like
perception. (. . .) Certainly, many experiments have now showed
that we track the beliefs of others automatically, as part of our
intuitive monitoring of the world around us, and that like our
perceptual experiences, these representations of others’ mental
states fade quickly if we do not focus on them (. . .).
My opinion is that the quasi-perceptual character of
mindreading makes this processing device unable to process the
kind of information that characterizes narrative. The inherently
temporal (which is also inherently spatial, as I shall see) nature of
narrative leads us to suppose that mindreading is not the device
that is able to ensure the human processing ability to tell stories.
To process the temporal nature of narrative, first of all, what we
need is a time machine.
The Time Machine
The recruitment in Oldowan niche has brought to the fore
the social role of the intellect. As noted above, however, the
recruitment for cooperative purposes requires something more
than the unique functioning of the social brain. Gärdenfors
(2003) and Gärdenfors and Osvath (2010) showed that the
cooperative foundation of human communication is closely
related to the ability of individuals to project themselves into
a space-time that is different from the current one. In Osvath
and Gärdenfors (2005; Gärdenfors and Osvath, 2010) opinion,
prospective cognition represents the adaptive answer to the
selective pressures of Oldowan niche:
The Oldowan lifestyle was in a way signified by an extension
of time and space. For example, there were long delays between
the acquisition and the use of the tool, as well as considerable
geographical distances between the sources of tool raw material
sources and killing sites. (. . .) We submit that these cognitive skills
became more important of the Oldowan hominins and had an
obvious ecological use (Gärdenfors and Osvath, 2010, p. 108).
At present, we know that the ability to travel in time is
tied to a specific cognitive system. Suddendorf and Corballis
(1997, 2007) coined the term Mental Time Travel (MTT) to
refer to “the faculty that allows humans to mentally project
themselves backward in time to re-live, or forward to prelive
events” (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007, p. 299). The idea that
MTT would be one of the cognitive systems at the foundation
of human evolution is widely shared. That said, what is the
relationship between the ability to travel in time and language?
The prevailing view associates projection systems with the birth
of symbolic thinking. At the base of Gärdenfors and Osvath’s
(2010, P. 104) thesis is the idea that
the evolutionary gain of being able to communicate about
referents that are not yet present is that collaborative forms of
long-term planning become possible. Symbolic communication
is an efficient way of solving problems concerning cooperation
about future goals – more efficient than iconic miming.
As several authors argued that the distinguishing feature of
human communication is its symbolic nature (Deacon, 1997),
the question of whether the use of symbols is a prerogative
of human communication is controversial (e.g., Seyfarth et al.,
1980; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986; Lyn et al., 2011). I would
not explore in detail this dispute. The point of my interest
is that, irrespective of the role that the prospective cognition
has in respect to the origins of symbolic communication, the
role of the ecological brain can be used in favor of a stronger
and less controversial evidence of the distinctive character of
human communication. My thesis is that through the extension
in time and space imposed by the Oldowan niche, the prospective
cognition has promoted a selective pressure for the development
of the ability to tell stories. From my point of view, in fact,
the cognitive systems that allow individuals to travel in space
and time do not affect only the symbolic character of the
communication but also the way in which symbolic expressions
are organized in discourses governed by global coherence
(Cosentino, 2011; Cosentino and Ferretti, 2014; Ferretti, 2014).
Following Corballis (2011, p. 111), it is possible to maintain
that “the same constructive process that allows us to reconstruct
the past and construct possible futures also allows us to invent
stories”. What is the empirical evidence to support the idea that
the navigation systems in space and time are the basis of our
ability to tell stories?
Time, Space, and Narrative
If my hypothesis is correct, the ability to navigate in time must
have repercussions on the narrative level and, in particular, on
global coherences — the property that I have laid the foundation
of human ability to build appropriate discourses. In order to
evaluate this hypothesis (in a study conducted with the University
of Udine and the Bambino Gesù Hospital in Rome), we have
submitted autistic children to a narrative test. At the basis
of our research were two orders of considerations. The first
concerned the data related to the projection in time capabilities
of autistic subjects (e.g., Jackson and Atance, 2008; Lind and
Bowler, 2010; Lind et al., 2014; Marini et al., 2016). The second
concerned the results related to deficit of global coherence in
the narrative of these subjects (cf. for a review Stirling et al.,
2014). Research on MTT skills in autistic children and those
related to global coherence deficits are independent and, to our
knowledge, there has been no finalized research to identify a
causal correlation between the difficulties of autistic children
in time projection and their narrative skills. In the study we
conducted, we hypothesized that the narrative deficits of these
subjects would respond specifically to their inability to travel
in time. In our research, we administered non-linguistic tasks
of MTT to autistic children in order to determine a subgroup
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of subjects with deficit in time-traveling. The hypothesis was
that this subgroup of individuals showed greater difficulties in
building global coherent stories. The data from our research
confirmed the hypothesis (Marini et al., submitted).
These results represent an important step in the re-evaluation
of the MTT role in processing narrative. This is an important
clarification with respect to the studies that considered global
coherence in reference exclusive to the causal links between
segments of discourse (as in Trabasso’s model): Global coherence
is the joint product of the processing systems that manage the
causal structure of discourse segments and the projection systems
that manage the traveling (back and forward) into the plot of the
story. Given the importance of the narrative capacity in defining
the specific properties of human communication, the idea that
the projection devices are in the foreground among of the systems
that regulate global coherence is an important step in defining
a language model very differently from that assumed by the
proponents of the social brain.
So far, I have insisted on the temporal nature of the narrative
and on the role played by the projection in time in processing
storytelling. Since to claim that the projection in time has
a role in managing the global coherence is, as we shall see,
largely equivalent to claim that projection in space has a role in
processing global coherence, it is time to pay attention to the
space navigation devices. In The Art of Memory, Yates (1966)
describes the “loci method” used by ancient Greek and Roman
orators to maintain the route of discourse in public debates: This
method makes extensive use of the metaphor of navigation and,
in particular, the construction of specific spaces located along the
route whose attractiveness plays a central role in the construction
of the discourse plan. In effect, spatial navigation represents, even
intuitively, a good metaphor for thinking about the processes at
the foundation of discourse and narrative. Both Lewis’ definition
(1994, p. 82) that stated “the first requirements of any system
of navigation is to enable the voyager to take his departure
and continue toward his objective in the right direction” and
Gallistel’s (1990, p. 35) idea that navigation is “the process of
determining and maintaining a course or trajectory from one
place to another” illustrate perfectly my perspective. The ability
to maintain a trajectory in the right direction is a core component
of the process involved in approaching a destination. Indeed, in
order to reach the expected destination, one needs to keep the
intended route and overcome geographic obstacles. In a very
similar way, the process of discourse construction also relies on
the ability to identify a goal (i.e., the content the speaker intends
to convey to the listener) and to construct the route and maintain
the right trajectory to express it. Similar to navigation in space, the
discourse plan is strongly linked to difficulties in maintaining the
course to reach a given destination. In fact, in the same manner
as in space navigation, the achievement of the communicative
goal depends on the continuous realignments implemented by
speakers to rebuild the route in the face of continual digressions
imposed by the different points of view that are typical of verbal
communication (Ferretti, 2013; Ferretti et al., 2013). Building
the route and maintaining the right trajectory to the goal is
equivalent, in narrative terms, to building and maintaining the
global coherence of discourse. What kind of evidence can we offer
to justify the involvement of navigation systems in the processing
of discourse coherence? Starting from the empirical evidence of
narrative deficits in individuals with Williams syndrome (WS)
(Marini et al., 2010) and the difficulties of these subjects in spatial
orientation and navigation (e.g., Lakusta et al., 2010) in Ferretti
et al. (2013), we assumed that the narrative difficulties shown by
WS subjects could refer to their difficulties in navigation in space.
Although at the moment there are not direct experimental results
(e.g., as in the case of autism) to support my assumption, the idea
that the difficulty of navigation in space of WS subjects could
be related to their narrative difficulties is not only a speculative
hypothesis. In support of my thesis I can appeal to two forms of
empirical data. The first concerns the fact that space and time
are based on (at least in some of its fundamental constituents)
a widely shared neural substrate. The second concerns the
experimental data on the role of the hippocampus (i.e., the shared
neural substrate) in the ability to tell stories.
At the level of ordinary language, the use of spatial metaphors
to conceptualize time (as when we say that future in front of us)
is a well-known phenomenon (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; for a
recent review of the huge debate on the topic Athanasopoulos
et al., 2016). A phenomenon of this kind seems warranted by the
fact that the close link between space and time representation is
well demonstrated by brain anatomy (Corballis, 2013, 2015). The
discovery of place cells has allowed O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) to
argue that the hippocampus, that is the basis of spatial cognition
in rodents, is the substratum for episodic memory of humans
(Dudchenko, 2010). The fact that the hippocampus is behind
much of the construction of both our spatial maps and our
mental journeys backward and forward in time is well known
and uncontroversial (Corballis, 2015). However, are there any
empirical data in favor of the thesis that the hippocampus is also
involved in storytelling tasks?
MacKay et al. (1998) investigated the role of the hippocampus
in managing global coherence by providing data in favor of
the specific role of binding that this brain system plays in the
discourse-level integration. While MacKay et al. (1998) examined
only the role of past projections, the study of Race et al. (2015,
p. 279) is the first to have tested the role of the hippocampus in
storytelling by considering also the projections into the future.
Using amnesic patients with Medial Temporal Lobe lesions, Race
et al. (2015, p. 279) proved the role of the hippocampus in the
construction of linguistically cohesive and coherent discourses.
Of particular interest to my purposes is the definition of global
coherence proposed by the authors at the conclusion of their
work. After maintaining that “contextual measures of discourse
coherence reflect the degree to which a narrative is oriented
in space and time” and that “the hippocampus supports the
creation of narrative context by structuring linguistic elements
around spatiotemporally specific details”, Race et al. (2015,
p. 279) proposed a definition of global coherence perfectly in line
with my hypothesis in this article: “Discourse coherence reflects
the development of a unified theme, spatiotemporally specific
context, and chronologically ordered narrative”.
The thesis of the space-time basis of narrative ability seems to
be empirically as well as theoretically justified. The result of the
arguments summarized to this point is that the ecological brain
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plays an important role in the actual processing of the narrative
language. Nevertheless, the justification of the role of projection
systems in narrative processing is still not a proof of the fact
that the ecological brain is involved in the origin of language.
Therefore, the remaining step to take is to prove that the narrative
skills represent the evolutionary drive to the evolution of human
communication.
THE NARRATIVE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE
The intuitive thesis of the relationship between language and
narrative is that the ability to tell stories represents the final
outcome of an evolutionary process that has in language its
starting point. To argue that narrative skills are the core abilities
required for the origin of language is to justify a strongly
counterintuitive hypothesis. However, how do we justify this
hypothesis? The first step in support of the narrative origin
of language thesis is to show the possibility of a form of
storytelling without language. While the thesis that narrative
must be considered the product of language is supported by
distinguished scholars (Scalise Sugiyama, 2005; Collins, 2013), it
is equally possible to argue that storytelling is independent from
language (for a review, cf. Sibierska, in press). Boyd (2009, p. 159),
for example, has suggested that “narrative need not involve
language. It can operate through modes like mime, still pictures,
shadow-puppets, or silent movies. It need not be restricted to
language”. The idea that narrative is independent from language
supports the thesis that our ability to tell stories may pre-date
language, and could potentially have underpinned the latter’s
evolution. The statement that narrative is language-independent
paves the way for the hypothesis that our ancestral relatives
were able to tell stories before they started talking. Specifically,
the acknowledgment that our ancestors possessed cognitive
systems responsible for space-time projections suggests that they
were endowed with the cognitive tools necessary to manage
narrative representations long before (and independently from)
their ability to manage language. By what means, then, did the
transition from the ability to produce narrative representations
to the narrative origin of language come about? The argument
that binds the narrative form of representation to the origin of
language is based on the theoretical assumption that thought,
which precedes language, imposes a constraint upon the form
of thought’s communication (cf. Cosentino and Ferretti, 2015).
From this assumption, it follows that, if humans think in
a predominantly narrative form, it is plausible to maintain
that language (whose primary, but not exclusive, function is
to express thoughts) finds the most appropriate form for its
expression in the narrative medium. Following Corballis (2015,
2016), the origin of language should be considered an event
driven by the need to make public the individual (internal and
private) mental projections in space and in time. If the form of
representation imposes constraints on the way we communicate
our thoughts, this means that our ancestors were once faced
with the requirement to invent a proper communicative medium
to express the mental narratives they used to represent reality.
Pantomime was thus the ideal communicative medium used
by our ancestors to express the spatial-temporal nature of this
representation. As such, it may be assumed that this is the basis
on which our linguistic narrative abilities are founded.
From the communicative point of view, the advantage
of pantomime is that, as pointed out by Arbib (2012),
quoting Stokoe (2001), “provides open-ended possibilities
for communication that work without prior instruction of
convention” (Arbib, 2012, p. 219). Pantomime, in fact, represents
the connection ring between lower level non-conventional
capabilities such as imitation and higher level conventional
capabilities such the proto-sign. Pantomimic communication is
easy to understand (the iconic character gives it transparency),
and its functioning does not require specifically communicative
processing devices. Such considerations militate in favor of the
idea that, by using pantomime, our ancestral relatives were able
to tell stories long before (and in a total absence of) language. As
McBride (2014, p. 3) maintained:
Mimes are not language. The proposal is that mimes come into
being as a way of telling stories long before any possibility of
language existed or was even anticipated. Mime was a complete
storytelling process well within the talents of the hominins in
whose bands it occurred. These individuals had zero concept of
language, but they could manage mimed stories and understand
them. Mimes and their understanding required nothing that every
hominin did not already have.
The arguments in favor of the autonomous and independent
nature of pantomime mark a point in favor of the idea that
the ability to tell stories can be considered a skill that our
ancient precursors possessed long before they were able to
use a language. However, recognizing the autonomous and
independent character of pantomime is not enough to explain
how it can be considered as the evolutionary impulse that gave
rise to human language. In order to gain this result, there remain
few issues to address.
A first step is the definition of pantomime. Zywiczynski
et al. (in press) in a review article proposed a very articulated
taxonomy. While I recognize the importance of a detailed
distinction of pantomime for the study of the origin of language,
in this paper, I discuss it from a more general point of view:
the analysis of the theoretical approaches that focus on those
distinguishing aspects of pantomime from symbols. According to
the proponents of the bodily mimesis hypothesis (Donald, 1991,
2001; Zlatev, 2008, 2014) for example, pantomime represents
the bridge to study the transition to symbolic communication.
Donald (1991, 2001) is the founder of a view that considers
mimetic culture (of which pantomime is an integral part) as the
evolutionary precursor of symbolic culture. According to these
authors, the selective pressures driving the transition from iconic
gestures toward abstract and arbitrary symbols depend on the
difficulties of pantomime in representing events or objects. In
Arbib’s (2012, p. 219) opinion “it’s hard to pantomime blue”; also
Corballis (2015, p. 91) insisted on the same point: “[P]antomime
is inefficient and often ambiguous, and needed to be developed
into a system of symbols whose meanings were clear, and
understood by members of the community”. Enhancing the
difficulty of pantomime (focusing on its negative traits) is a way to
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explain how pantomime could have acted as a selective pressure
directed to the birth of an arbitrary and abstract expressive
system.
That said, there is a different scenario to consider. The role
of pantomime in narrative paves the way to the opportunity to
take into account a positive role of pantomime in the origin of
language. In effect, even if pantomime is marked by ambiguity
and inefficiency in representing the details of objects and events,
pantomime also permits the inclusion of objects and events
in a uniform and coherent frame of reference. So interpreted,
pantomime represents the expressive tool that is able to bridge
together the narrative character of human representation of
reality with the narrative character of human communication
of reality. From this point of view, enhancing the positive
role of pantomime in language means enhancing those aspects
of communication without which human language would not
function properly, and above all, it would never have originated.
CONCLUSION
In the pars destruens of this article, I have examined the view of
the social brain hypothesis of the origin of language. Against this
hypothesis, my idea is that the models inspired by the primacy of
the social brain are not able to draw a useful distinction between
animal and human communication. If the social brain is not
enough to justify the distinctive character of human language,
then, at best, the social brain is a necessary but not sufficient
condition to explain the origin of human language.
Against the primacy of the social brain, in the pars construens
of this article, I argued that human language has a narrative
foundation, and that a pivotal role in the evolution of those
abilities that allowed humans to free themselves from the
mechanical automation of animal communication has been
played by navigational systems in space and time. Such a
conception of language opens the way to the idea that the
ecological brain has a role as much important as the social brain
in explaining for language origin. In addition to explaining the
evolution of the symbolic level of language, the navigational
systems in space and time are able to explain how humans can
process narrative representations of reality and forms of narrative
communication of reality.
Without the ecological brain at their disposal, our ancestral
relatives could never tell stories; without being able to tell stories,
as should be clear at this point, they would have never developed
the kind of communication that distinguishes humans from all
other animals.
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